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NOTES
ACCELERATION CLAUSES IN TIME PAPER UNDER THE
NIL AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Article III of the Uniform Commercial Code,1 dealing with Com-
mercial Paper, has made numerous changes in the law of negotiable instru-
ments.2  This Note is concerned with an examination of some of those
changes stemming from the provision which reads, in its final form: 3
"(1) An instrument is payable at a definite time if by its terms it is
payable
"(c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration ..
Essentially this means that no acceleration clause destroys the negotiability
of commercial paper under the new Code because of lack of time certainty.
4
Whether or not this is a wise provision in light of current commercial prac-
tices, it is undeniably iconoclastic.
The history of the many types of clauses which mature a promissory
note earlier than the fixed date stated in the note is at least as confusing
as the current state of the law regarding them.5 This confusion is due,
perhaps, to the inability of courts to resolve the conflict between the inter-
ests of the maker and the holder within the framework of the Negotiable
Instruments Law. The maker (debtor) of a time note, unlike the maker
of a demand note, does not expect to be called upon to pay before the
ultimate date. He normally believes that an acceleration clause has been
inserted in the evidence of his debt in order that the holder may be pro-
tected against his insolvency or similar contingencies, and he does not expect
acceleration without good cause. The mere threat of such acceleration, if
1. Throughout the footnotes, the Code will be cited as UCC.
2. For a general discussion of the various innovations of the Code, see Beutel,
Comparison, of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3, and the Negotiable Instru-
mentts Law, 30 Nan. L. REv. 531 (1951) ; and Cosway, Itmovations in Articles Three
and Four of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LA.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 284 (1951).
3. UCC § 3-109 (Official Draft, 1952). Unless otherwise specified, all sections
and comments cited are those in the Official Draft.
4. There are of course objections which might crop up under other requirements
for negotiability. UCC §3-104 provides: "(1) Any writing to be a negotiable
instrument within this Article must (a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and
no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except
as authorized by this Article; and (c) be payable on demand or at a definite term;
and (d) be payable to order or to bearer."
5. Such a historical survey was taken in Note, Acceleration and Negotiability
in Chattel Notes and Collateral Notes, 37 CoL L. REV. 430 (1937).
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allowed, would prevent accurate planning as to future incidence of lia-
bilities; and its actual occurrence could throw him into financial straits at
a moment's notice. The maker is therefore worried about the avaricious
creditor. On the other hand, the holder (creditor) is worried about the
possibility that unforeseen future events may bring' about the maker's
default. Especially in periods of over-rapid business expansion and rela-
tive instability of money, a feeling of insecurity may be engendered by
knowledge of facts that are hard to prove, or by confidential information,
or even by mere suspicion. Therefore he does not wish to be bound to
accelerate only upon stated contingencies. The resolution of these conflicts
is not easy, and this is one area where the "uniform" NIL has not resulted
in clarifying the law. The applicable provision reads:
"Section 4. An instrument is payable at a determinable future time8
. . .which is expressed to be payable,
"(2) On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified there-
in.
This section is sufficiently ambiguous to allow any result in accelera-
tion cases. It has been suggested that no acceleration clauses should destroy
negotiability under the NIL since a note containing one is surely payable
"on or before a fixed . . . future time." 7 On the other hand, it is quite
possible that § 4(2) was intended to provide only for the negotiability of
notes payable before the fixed date at the option of the maker. Before
the adoption of the NIL, it was held that a note payable "on or before"
a certain date meant that only the maker had the option of payment before
the date of maturity and that the holder could not sue before that time.8
Even after the NIL it was assfimed that such was the rule.9 However,
the overwhelming number of cases do not hold to either theory, as will
be seen.
The requirement of certainty as to time of payment is 'dictated by
practical business and legal considerations. Uncertain time leads to highly
speculative money value of the paper, and increases both the danger of
taking overdue paper, and the difficulty of making presentment and giving
6. This is one of the formal requirements of negotiability imposed by NIL § 1.
7. See BirtroN, BILLS AND Nor s 109-110 (1943); BauT=as BRANNAN, N.Go-
TIAIE INsTUmENTS LAW 276 (7th ed. 1948); National City Bank of Cleveland v.
Erskine & Sons, 158 Ohio St. 450, 463, 110 N.E.2d 598, 604 (1953) (concurring
opinion citing BzuTIm's BRANNAN, supra).
8. Moore v. Horsley, 42 Ark. 163 (1883); Mattison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421
(1875) semble, but cited as standing for this proposition in Helmer v. Krolick, 36
Mich. 371, 372 (1877) ; Jordan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St. 586 (1869) seinble.
9. See Lovenberg v. Henry, 104 Tex. 550, 140 S.W. 1079 (1911) (statute of
limitations problem involving an "on or before" note, majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions all assume that payment could not be forced before maturity
date) ; see Utah State National Bank v. Smith, 180 Cal. 1, 5, 179 Pac. 160, 161
(1919); cf. Union State Bank v. Benson, 38 N.D. 396, 165 N.W. 509 (1917).
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notice of dishonor at the right time.'0 But, insofar as these considerations
are concerned, acceleration paper does not differ from demand paper whose
negotiability is expressly provided for." Furthermore, a note payable at
a definite future time subject to acceleration is more certain than demand
paper since it at least provides a definite time beyond which it cannot run.
Yet various types of clauses incense courts enough to impose the sanction
of non-negotiability on the notes, but not enough to declare the clauses
unenforceable.' 2
THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE IN PRACTICE
Since the formal requirement of the NIL is certainty of time, many
attempts have been made to evolve a test whereby commercial practices
could be fitted. into this requirement. The most famous of these is the
suggestion by Professor Chafee that negotiability should not be destroyed
by acceleration of maturity if the acceleration is possible "only by the
performance of an act regularly incident to the collection of the paper." 13
The theory behind this suggestion is that the business world would consider
paper readily salable only if it were unaffected by facts which are not
stated on the instrument, or which cannot be ascertained during the normal
business procedure in collection and payment. However, the types of
clauses in use both then and now are considered to be for the protection
of the holder, as will appear. This paper is therefore more suitable for
circulation as a substitute for money than "clean" paper,' 4 i.e., promissory
notes with no extraneous clauses in them.15
It is an interesting phenomenon that the banks, which would ordinarily
be most vitally interested in problems of negotiability, are not concerned
about the effect on negotiability of acceleration clauses. Various bankers
in the city of Philadelphia, when interviewed, stated that they accept
notes for discount only from their customers or from people whose credit
is well known, in this way insuririg themselves against the default of the
maker. Regarded in this light, negotiability of a note is of no consequence
since they will accept a non-negotiable note as collateral for a loan to their
customer. The few notes containing acceleration clauses present no prac-
tical difficulty in the method of computing their value. Banks discount
10. For a critical analysis of these considerations in the light of business prac-
tices before 1920, see Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 HAv.
L. REv. 747, 753-754 (1919).
11. NIL § 1(3).
12. The clauses will usually be enforced as written, subject to normal contract
defenses. See, e.g., Messner v. Mallory, 107 Cal. App.2d 377, 236 P.2d 898 (1951).
But cf. note 69 infra.
13. Chafee, supra note 10, at 756.
14. In Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Marsh, 24 N.Y.S.2d 281, 285 (Sup. Ct. 1940) it
was said: "The value [of such paper] is certain and the danger of insolvency is to
some extent overcome."
15. This type of note is a perfect example of Chief Justice Gibson's statement
that "a negotiable bill or note is a courier without luggage." Overton v. Tyler, 3
Pa. 346, 347 (1846).
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the note at the amount it will produce at maturity and proceed against the
negotiator if the note has to be accelerated and thus causes a loss to the
bank.1' Even all of this is largely theoretical since only a very small per-
centage of the paper offered to banks for discount contains acceleration
clauses, and only a small number of these destroy negotiability.
The notes that banks have their borrowers sign are in a different
category. They contain many clauses which are considered to be for the
protection of the bank, although some of them destroy negotiability. But
this is of no practical import, for rediscounting of notes with the Federal
Reserve System has virtually stopped, 1 because of a shift in the character
of banks' assets. They now have a substantial amount of government
bonds against which they can borrow. However, despite the lack of further
negotiation, the bankers, remembering the 1930's, would still like to have
their notes negotiable, so they try to keep out the negotiability-destroying
clauses as much as possible.
Other groups which receive many promissory notes are the finance
and small loan companies. With their high degree of credit risk they
naturally have an assortment of acceleration clauses in their notes, but the
notes are not discounted or negotiated to banks. If the lenders become
hard-pressed for ready cash, they merely establish a line of credit with a
bank on the basis of their accounts receivable.'
8
In the situations above described it is fair to say that acceleration
clauses are not regarded commercially as a problem of negotiability, but
rather as one of enforceability. It is platitudinous to state that- the law
should follow commercial practice,' 9 but this is perhaps the unexpressed
major premise in this area. Dean Prosser, reporting for the American
Law Institute, says: 2 "It seems evident that the courts which give un-
certainty of time of payment as a reason for denying negotiability are in
reality objecting to the acceleration clause itself. This objection may be
founded on abuses of the clause." And he further notes that "the effect of
16. So if a note were for $100 plus 61 interest, payable one year after date,
the amount discounted would be $106 giving the negotiator $99.64 if the discount
rate is 6%. If the note must be accelerated after 2 months, the bank would only
collect $101 from the maker, but would charge the negotiator's account with the
$5.00 lost.
17. An official of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia can recall only two
or three rediscounting transactions at his bank in the last ten years. This situation
is by no means localized. See PRESENT DAY BANKING 14 (1951): "With the
general decline in recent years in the volume of commercial paper and bankers
acceptances outstanding, discounting eligible paper is no longer an important means
of securing funds to adjust the money positions of the metropolitan commercial
banks."
18. This information is based on an interview, February 26, 1952, with Mr.
Curtiss Williams, Executive Vice President of the Pennsylvania Consumer Finance
Association which has approximately 500 individual loan companies as members.
19. See First Nat. Bank v. Skeen, 101 Mo. 683, 687, 14 S.W. 732, 733 (1890)
"The law governing such paper is the outgrowth of the usages of commerce. In
determining disputed questions in its application it is often useful to recur to the
objects and purposes of the law and to observe how far they may be promoted or
defeated by the acceptance of any proposed construction of it."
20. UCC, COMMENTS AND NoTEs To ARTICLE III 43 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1946).
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denying negotiability to acceleration paper is not to remedy any abuses
arising in connection with the acceleration clause, which remains in effect
even if the instrument be treated as a simple contract. It is merely to open
the paper to defenses which have nothing to do with acceleration." This
Note will attempt to see how the cases support the proposition that accelera-
tion clauses are a problem of enforceability, not of negotiability.
ACCELERATION CLAUSES BEFORE THE COURTS
The cases are so confused in their holdings and reasonings in this
area that Professor Aigler was prompted to say: 21 ,, . . there is no test
according to which a line may be drawn differentiating the holdings. The
uncertainty in the law is pronounced and disconcerting." However, the
holdings of the cases can be made to fit into the pattern of a theory never
fully articulated by the courts, to wit: that the question of the negotiability-
destroying character of any particular acceleration clause is ruled by prin-
ciples analogous to those which control the doctrine of anticipatory repudia-
tion of contracts. This latter doctrine, accepted by the vast majority of
American jurisdictions,22 provides that a party to a bilateral contract com-
mits a breach by any voluntary affirmative act (before a failure to perform
at the time stated) which renders substantial performance of his contrac-
tual duties impossible, or apparently impossible 2 3 A promissory note is
a unilateral contract if it is a contract at all, 24 and therefore the doctrine
cannot be literally applied. But the principle that it reflects fits just as well
into the field of commercial paper, i.e., that one need not wait to sue until
the final time for performance if it is clear that substantial performance will
not occur 2 5 This principle has been partially recognized by NIL § 2(3),
which would allow a term that "upon default in payment of any instal-
ment or of interest, the whole shall become due." 26
Naturally, in the field of credit extension, where knowledge of shaky
financial condition often comes from confidential sources, the manifestation
need not be by an affirmative act of the maker in all cases. With this in
21. Aigler, Time Certainty in Negotiable Paper, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 313, 322
(1929).
22. See 4 Co.BN, CoNTRAcrs § 959 (1951) ; WIL.ISTON, CONTRAcTS § 1337 (Rev.
ed. 1937).
23. RSSTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs § 318 (Supp. 1948).
24. "A negotiable instrument is a written promise, or order to pay to the order
of a named payee, or to bearer, a specified sum of money. It is on its face unilateral
and unconditional." 4 CoRiN, CoNlaAcrs § 863 (1951).
25. See Gardner, Inquiry Into the Priziplex of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 14 (1932): "'Anticipatory breaches' differ from 'actual' breaches only
in the fact that the non-existence of the predicted power is made manifest before
the date for performance, and in some other manner than by the unsuccessful effort to
put the predicted power into practical effect."
26. Such a term only results in the sum payable being a sum certain by that
section. However, such a clause must surely not destroy negotiability for the drafts-
men would not have given a defective example. Such have been the holdings. See
note 29 infra. These clauses are also enforceable as written. See, e.g., Harris v.
Kessler, 124 Cal. App. 299, 12 P.2d 467 (1932).
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mind it is possible to state the proposed rationalization of the cases: when
a note contains clauses which accelerate maturity upon the occurrence of
facts which manifest an inability or unwillingness to pay on the part of the
maker, the note will be given full effect; but when the accelerating facts do
not manifest such an inability, the note will be declared non-negotiable.
Such a penalty might possibly be justified on the ground that the maker
trusted that his original creditor would not invoke the clause without good
reason.2 7  No trust was placed in anyone else; 28 therefore, to protect the
maker the court, by holding the note non-negotiable, allows him to inter-
pose personal defenses even against one who would otherwise be a holder in
due course. This of course is harsh on the holder, but it is merely another
example of courts policing commercial practices. A holding of non-
negotiability was thought to have a strong deterrent effect on the use of
the clauses originally, and perhaps historically it did, in the era when nego-
tiation was more frequent than today.
Thirty-seven notes used by banks and loan companies were analyzed
and found to contain twenty-one different types of acceleration clauses. The
cases dealing with these clauses are grouped below according to the type of
factual situation the clauses describe, in an effort to place the cases into the
rationalization stated above.
Default by the Maker.-Thirty-two clauses were found which ac-
celerated "if default shall be made in the payment of any of said installments,
or sums on this note, or any renewal thereof." Such notes are plainly not
certain as to time or amount in vacuo, but there is unanimity in holding
that these clauses do not destroy negotiability.2 9 The same also applies
where a series of notes is matured on default in the payment of any one
note.3 0 These accelerating facts show an inability or unwillingness on the
part of the maker to pay his obligations when due,31 and the holdings of
27. Especially is this trust important when the clause allows acceleration "when
the holder deems himself insecure." Such a clause is seldom used today.
28. It is arguable that the maker realized the note would be negotiated. This
however seems specious in light of the 'business facts of life discussed above. In
other areas of commercial dealings, such as installment retail buying, negotiation is con-
templated but most of these notes have on them the name of the ultimate payee and
it is in his discretion that the trust is actually placed.
29. E.g., Dorbecker v. Downey Co., 88 Ind. App. 557, 163 N.E. 535 (1928);
Illinois Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Day, 178 Okla. 284, 62 P.2d 970 (1936);
International Finance Co. v. Magilansky, 105 Pa. Super. 309, 161 Atl. 613 (1932).
See also note 26 supra.
30. E.g., Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Dent, 206 Ky. 405, 267 S.W. 202 (1924);
Rees, Taylor Co. v. Mayflower Diners, 110 N.J.L. 437, 166 Atl. 96 (1933); Koppler
v. Bugge, 168 Wash. 182, 11 P.2d 236 (1932).
31. This is true as a general proposition. But of course there may always be
exceptions. So in Canton Hardware Co. v. Haler, 142 Ohio St. 541, 53 N.E.2d
509 (1944), the maker refused to pay an installment because he had a claim for
breach of warranty against the payee. The court indicated that the maker would
not be in default if the jury found the damages for the breach to be greater than
the amount of the installments due at the time of suit. Here, however, the jury
found for the maker but in an amount less than the matured installments. The court
therefore allowed acceleration.
In Collins v. Collins Estate, Inc., 207 S.C. 452, 36 S.E.2d 584 (1946), the maker
of an installment-default-acceleration note died before time for payment of a crucial
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negotiability are perfectly consistent with the principles of the anticipatory
repudiation doctrine. Also conforming to these principles is the type of
clause found in eleven notes that "failure to perform any agreement here-
under" matures the note, and this clause has been held not to impair
negotiability.8 2
Facts Indicating an Inability or Unwillingness to Pay.-Thirty notes
contained a clause accelerating the time of payment on "the death of any
maker ;" four included "dissolution of any corporate maker ;" 32 matured
upon "the insolvency of the maker" and "the committing of an act of
Bankruptcy or the filing of a petition under any of the provisions of the
National Bankruptcy Act ;" and 22 notes accelerated upon "the appointment
of a receiver for maker." All of these occurrences manifest to the creditor
the high probability that the maker will be unable to perform his obliga-
tions. This type of acceleration is particularly important to the holder since
it allows him to get into the race of the creditors which is likely to develop
on the happening of the above contingencies. In the reported cases, notes
containing all or a combination of these clauses have been held negotiable8s
Some notes have had only the insolvency provision and they also were held
negotiable.84 Along the same line as these clauses is one accelerating upon
"the making of an assignment for the benefit of creditors." This provision
was in 29 notes and should be governed by the same principles as above
since this is merely another Act of Bankruptcy. 5
Where loans are made on the faith of a going business, it is only
natural to assume there will be acceleration upon the failure of the business.
installment, leaving his wife as executrix of his estate. She felt that she might not
be able to make the payments exactly on time because of troubles in the administra-
tion of the estate. Since she did not want the holder to sell the stock pledged, she
brought suit for an injunction pendente lite before the time set for payment. The
injunction was granted, seemingly on the theory that the court had the necessary
power to grant a permanent injunction against acceleration. Implicit in this holding
might be the fear that the maker's estate could be excessively depleted by having
its stock sold for a song just because of a failure to pay on time. This failure might
be due to difficulties in administration and not to an inability to pay. In fact, this
case seemed to involve a solvent decedent.
32. E.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Guarantee Title Co., 113 Kan. 311, 214 Pac.
610 (1923); Davis v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 171 Tenn. 383, 103
S.W.2d 579 (1937) (these cases involved clauses in the note accelerating on failure
to comply with any condition in a mortgage which secured the note) ; Manlius First
Nat. Bank v. Garland, 160 Ill. App. 407 (1911). Contra: Central Savings Bank v.
Coulter, 72 Cal. App. 78, 236 Pac. 956 (1925) (acceleration on breach of covenants
as to payments of interest, taxes, etc. destroys negotiability under NIL § 4 because
it is payable on a "contingency").
33. E.g., Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius, 214 Wis. 637, 254 N.W. 355 (1934);
Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749, 169 S.E. 208 (1933); Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La.
970, 76 So. 166 (1917).
34. E.g., Chelsea Exch. Bank v. Warner, 118 Misc. 159, 195 N.Y. Supp. 419
(Sup. Ct. 1922); Wright v. Seaboard Steel & Manganese Corp., 272 Fed. 807 (2d
Cir. 1921) semble. But cf. Great Falls Nat. Bank v. Young, 67 Mont. 328, 215
Pac. 651 (1923). But see Anderson v. Border, 87 Mont. 4, 10, 285 Pac. 174, 176
(1930).
35. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (4) (1952). A note con-
taining such a clause is enforceable as written. Gaston v. Boston Penny Say. Bank,
233 Mass. 23, 123 N.E. 101 (1919).
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One of the notes analyzed so provided. Four others accelerated upon
"suspension of business." Clauses relating to failure of the maker do not
destroy negotiability,36 and are thus in accord with the rationalization at-
tempted. So also is a clause reading ". . . if any maker shall . . .
secrete or dispose of his or her property with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud his or her creditors," 37 or "if any maker shall abscond or remove
from the jurisdiction." These clauses, appearing in two notes, show the
holder that he will meet with difficulty in enforcing payment if these facts
occur. No cases have been found interpreting these clauses, 38 but there is
every reason to believe they would be held not to destroy negotiability.
They fit the anticipatory repudiation theory and also the language of the
time certainty requirements espoused by the courts.39
In none of the situations described in this section is there a need to
protect the maker against the exercise of the accelerating right by someone
other than the original creditor, since a decision to accelerate on these facts
cannot be considered to be unreasonable or unfair.
Facts Not Necessarily Implying an Inability to Pay. -- Some clauses
describe factual situations which only give rise to an inference of a pending
inability to pay. The stronger the inference the more likely it is that the
note will be held negotiable.
Such a strong inference arises from a clause maturing a note upon "the
entry of a judgment against any maker." This clause appeared 13 times,
and was qualified in five instances by "which is not satisfied within 10
days." Twenty-two other notes were matured upon "the issuance of an
attachment against any maker." The occurrence of these facts suggests
an inability on the part of the maker to pay his debts 4o and it could not be
36. Dart Nat. Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283, 241 N.W. 858 (1932); West
Point Banking Co. v. Gaunt, 150 Tenn. 74, 262 S.W. 38 (1924). Also, the same
result was reached where the clause accelerated on "disposing of business."
McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil Co., 38 Idaho 470, 222 Pac. 286 (1923).
37. This is also an Act of Bankruptcy. See 30 STAT. 546 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. §21(a)(1) (1952).
38. There are cases on a closely analogous clause, to wit: "if [the property
given as consideration for the note] is levied upon or maker attempts to sell or re-
move same," then acceleration is allowed. These clauses of course should not destroy
negotiability since they fit the theory propounded, and it has been so held. Abingdon
Bank & Trust Co. v. Shiplett-Moloney Co., 316 Ill. App. 79, 43 N.E.2d 857 (1942) ;
Schmidt v. Pegg, 172 Mich. 159, 137 N.W. 524 (1912). The clauses discussed in
the text are not limited to removing any specific property, but these cases are per-
suasive for the same result here.
39. See McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil Co., 38 Idaho 470, 480, 222 Pac.
286, 290 (1923) : "[acceleration clauses do not destroy negotiability if] none of the
conditions in the acceleration clause depend upon any act of the holder, nor are they
within his control, but all of such contingencies depend either upon some act or
omission of the maker, or upon an event indicated in the paper not within the control
of either party." See also Aigler, supra note 21, at 326.
40. This is not necessarily true if the attachment is the normal foreign attach-
ment necessary to start suit against a non-resident. Bank officials today consider that
type of attachment sufficient to accelerate. If a court felt strongly about the harsh-
ness of this provision, they could destroy its negotiability by the same reasoning
as in note 44 infra.
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considered an abuse of discretion for the holder to mature his note earlier
to guard against an inability to pay that debt also. Notes containing such
clauses accordingly have been held negotiable.41 This result is easily justi-
fied where the note is in the hands of a distant holder, who should be able
to act on less evidence to get into the race of the creditors than the imme-
diate payee.
Today, applications for loans precede most grants and are relied upon
by the lenders to a great extent. If a false credit picture is painted, the
inference is strong that the loan would not have been granted but for the
misrepresentation. If these facts later come to light, the lender would want
to accelerate. Seven clauses were found which allowed acceleration upon
"any statements . . . which are the inducement for this loan, proving to
the satisfaction of the holder hereof to be untrue." In the only case found
on point,42 negotiability was not destroyed by a clause reading "should any
representation herein made be found untrue." The only difference between
the clauses is that the one in use today seems to let the date of maturity rest
on the "satisfaction of the holder." At first blush, it would seem that trust
is placed in the discretion of the creditor, but actually no maker could in
good conscience expect leniency after a falsehood in procuring the loan.
The problem of the unscrupulous creditor in this situation is more apparent
than real. If he wishes to accelerate, the jury must still find that the state-
ments were false to his satisfaction, and it is unlikely that they would so
find unless the evidence brought forward by the holder could reasonably
sustain the inference of falsity. The principles of the anticipatory repudia-
tion doctrine appropriate for commercial paper are thus satisfied and there
is high probability that the courts would hold that the present-day clause
does not destroy negotiability, since the reason for denying negotiability
in the case of an uncontrolled power in the holder is the feeling that such
power would give him an unfair advantage over the maker.43  Here the
maker has already taken advantage of the lender and he does not need that
protection.
Other clauses describe factual situations which give rise to very weak
inferences of inability to pay. Such a clause is one that matures the note
if "any legal or equitable proceedings are instituted against . . . any of
the undersigned." This was found in five notes. Clearly such an occur-
rence does not evince an inability to pay since the suit may be wholly un-
founded or instituted in collusion with the holder, and within the rational-
ization of this Note this clause should be held to destroy negotiability. One
such holding is reported under the NIL.44  Another type of such clause
41. Glide v. Sheridan, 173 Misc. 542, 18 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
42. Cook v. Parks, 46 Ga. App. 749, 169 S.E. 208 (1933).
43. See Palmer, Negotiable Instrumnts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
48 MicH. L. Ray. 255, 263 (1950).
44. Great Falls Nat. Bank v. Young, 67 Mont. 328, 215 Pac. 651 (1923). The
court noted that: "Also, the maker or an indorser, may be sued the next day after
the note is given, or the next week, upon a claim without any foundation, and over
which event neither the maker nor indorser would have any control, and the note
may be declared to be due and payable. .. ." Id. at 336, 215 Pac. at 653.
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was found in six notes, accelerating upon "the taking of possession or con-
trol of any substantial part of the property or business of any obligor by or
at the instance of any governmental or public authority." The commercial
lending institutions contemplate by this provision an attachment under a tax
lien or an attachment of contraband property. These events do not neces-
sarily mean that the maker's financial condition is bad and notes containing
such clauses should be non-negotiable.45
A borderline clause is one by which the maker can be forced to pay
before the ultimate date if he "suffers a fire loss." This clause was found in
only one promissory note in use today, but it has been twice held negotiable
in the past.46  Despite the fact that under such a clause a fire in the wood-
shed is an accelerable event, these holdings can possibly be rationalized on
the ground that this clause was only found in combination with other
clauses relating to the business operations of the maker,4T and therefore
the doctrine of ejusdem generis would limit the construction of this clause
to fire loss affecting the business.
Subjective Insecurity.-Insecurity is the usual state of mind accom-
panying a demand by the holder before maturity, and it is only natural
to find some clauses accelerating on the advent of that feeling. Four clauses
were found which accelerated "if the financial condition of the undersigned
shall so change as, in the judgment of the holder, to materially increase its
risks hereunder;" and five clauses read "any material adverse change in
the financial condition of any obligor." Clearly. discretion is given the
lender as to when to accelerate, and there seems to be no criterion which a
jury could apply to determine whether he actually did feel insecure. The
mere feeling of insecurity does not indicate a manifestation of a pending
inability to pay, and this clause should be held to destroy negotiability.
Such has been the almost unanimous holding.48 The reason given by the
courts here is that "the date of maturity is placed wholly under the control
of the holder, is completely dependent upon his whim or caprice, and is
45. It is possible that this clause describes a typical eminent domain case. If
anything, such a situation would indicate a fairly strong ability to pay since the
owner of the property would recover its fair value from the government exercising
the power of eminent domain. This payment would be in cash and his assets would
then be liquid instead of tied up in his business. The theory of this Note would then
dictate non-negotiability for this clause, but no cases have been found on point.
46. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Shaw-Leahy Co., 214 Cal. 108, 3 P.2d
1012 (1931); McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil Co., 38 Idaho 470, 222 Pac. 286
(1923).
47. The note in use today also accelerated on default in payment of interest or
principal, refusal to furnish additional collateral on demand, failure in business, in-
solvency, bankruptcy or death of the maker. The instruments in the cases in note
46 supra were identical with each other and accelerated also upon suspension of pay-
ment, giving a chattel mortgage, disposing of the business, and failing to pay any
prior trade acceptance.
48. E.g., Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S.W. 21 (1925);
Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239 (1911); Guio v. Lutes,
97 Ind. App. 157, 184 N.E. 416 (1933) ; Harrison v. Fugatt, 179 Okla. 367, 65 P.2d
1200 (1937); Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504,
162 Pac. 870 (1917). Contra: Dart Nat. Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283, 241 N.W.
858 (1932).
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independent of any act done or omitted by the maker." 49 This language
clearly accords with the proposition that acceleration clauses are problems
of enforceability,50 and the few cases which hold these clauses negotiable
recognize this and say that the certainty of time requirements are met.51
However, the language of the majority of the cases fits within the basic
theory of this Note, and the holdings fit the attempted rationalization.
Default in Failing to Provide Additional Collateral.-The tendency
among lenders is to give unsecured loans to good credit risks. However,
if the credit is slightly shaky, collateral will be demanded on a 15-30%
margin depending on the commodity pledged.52  It is only natural that
if the value of the collateral falls the lender will wish the borrower to
furnish more. Thirteen of the notes examined accelerated "if the under-
signed shall not on demand furnish such further collateral . . . as shall
be satisfactory to the holder," and nine required that the maker "within
two hours after demand deposit with holder such additional security as
shall be satisfactory to the latter." A failure to make up the depreciation
in valuer53 indicates clearly a pending inability to pay, and these clauses
have been held not to destroy negotiability.5 4 The only difficulty with these
holdings is that the "satisfaction of the holder" smacks of subjective in-
49. See Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore. 581, 597, 183 Pac. 12, 18 (1919).
50. See text after note 20 supra.
51. In Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Marsh, 24 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. 1940), it was
said: ". . . there is no logical basis for distinguishing between an acceleration
clause which becomes operative when the holder determines that the maker's financial
affairs increase the holder's risk and a clause which becomes operative in the event
of death, insolvency or bankruptcy of the maker. . . . To hold that an instrument
payable at a fixed time but accelerable at the option of the holder destroys its nego-
tiability seems to me to be directly contrary to the plain meaning of [NIL § 4(2)]."
Id. at 285.
An interesting case is National City Bank of Cleveland v. Erskine & Sons, 158
Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E.2d 598 (1953). A chattel mortgage had been given and the
accompanying note accelerated "in the event that the chattel mortgage securing
this note is breached in any respect." The mortgage allowed the mortgagee to
declare the whole sum due if he for any reason deemed the indebtedness insecure.
The court held the note negotiable on the theory that the insecurity clause was not
incorporated into the note, since the word "breach" could only apply to the affirmative
covenants of the maker. This seems to be an obvious straining to reach a result.
One concurring opinion felt that the insecurity clause was available only to the
mortgagee and not to a subsequent holder. The other concurrence was based on the
theory that the note would be negotiable even if the insecurity clause were incorpo-
rated into it. See note 7 supra, and accompanying text. The dissenting judge felt that
the clause was incorporated and therefore the note was non-negotiable.
52. For example, a leading bank in Philadelphia will lend about 70% of the
value of marketable securities, up to 80% on Warehouse Receipts (depending on the
commodity-staples bring more), up to 85% on Trust Receipts, and up to 100o
on savings accounts or the cash surrender value of life insurance policies.
53. Today such additional collateral is not called for until the margin drops to
below 5-10%.
54. E.g., First Nat. Bank v. Stoneley, 111 N.J.L. 519, 168 AtI. 602 (1933);
Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank v. Warner, 145 La. 1022, 83 So. 228 (1919) ; Empire
Nat. Bank v. High Grade Oil Refining Co., 260 Pa. 255, 103 Atl. 602 (1918) ; West
Point Banking Co. v. Gaunt, 150 Tenn. 74, 262 S.W. 38 (1924); cf. Sommers v.
Goulden, 147 Okla. 51, 294 Pac. 175 (1930). Contra: First Nat. Bank v. McCartan,
206 Iowa 1036, 220 N.W. 364 (1928); American Finance Co. v. Bourne, 190 Okla.
332, 123 P.2d 671 (1942) .
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security. This obstacle is easily overcome if a requirement is imposed
that the seller's satisfaction or lack of it must be based upon reason and
must not be arbitrary or capricious. 55
Some courts have seized upon § 5 of the NIL to declare these notes
non-negotiable.5 6 That section provides: "An instrument which contains
an order or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is
not negotiable." However, no unconditional additional promise is made,
since the additional-collateral clause is always coupled with an acceleration
clause, and the maker always has the alternative of defaulting. It therefore
has been suggested that § 5 is not a proper tool to use in declaring such a
note non-negotiable.t
Sunnmary.-The cases, when analyzed according to the factual situa-
tions described, establish the proposition that the power to accelerate
will not destroy negotiability if it is conditioned upon the occurrence of
some act or event, objectively manifested, and of such a nature as to
indicate a probability that payment will not be made at the date of ultimate
maturity. But a clause allowing acceleration upon the happening of a
condition which cannot be established by objective evidence indicating an
inability to pay will destroy negotiability. This tends to show that the under-
lying theory behind the imposition of the sanction of non-negotiability is one
analogous to the anticipatory repudiation doctrine of contract law. The
doctrine itself has been held to be inapplicable in cases involving premature
suits on promissory notes without acceleration clauses.58 But this does not
mean that the principles cannot govern express provisions in the paper.
There are of course other types of clauses not much in evidence at present.
These clauses do not fit into any of the above categories but describe situa-
tions in which acceleration is provided for if the maker is able to pay sooner
than he expected. Such a clause might force earlier payment if the maker
"shall be able to collect a certain note against X." The maker needs no
protection here, the facts are easily ascertainable, and this clause has been
held negotiable. 59
55. This requirement was implicitly adopted in a sales contract situation in
James B. Berry's Sons Co. v. Monark Gasoline & Oil Co., 32 F.2d 74 (8th Cir.
1929). See also Harris v. Thomas, 17 Ala. App. 634, 88 So. 51 (1921) (same re-
quirement in a mortgage situation).
56. E.g., Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 116 Pac. 239 (1911);
Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 129 Atl. 506 (1925).
57. Chafee, s=pra note 10, at 783: "The question in every case is not whether
the act is technically 'additional' to the payment of money, but whether it is sub-
stantially so. If its real purpose is to aid the holder to secure the payment of money
and protect him from the risks of insolvency, if it steadies the value of the note, and
makes it circulate more readily, then it should not be fatal to negotiability." Also
see Finley v. Smith, 165 Ky. 445, 453, 177 S.W. 262, 266 (1915).
58. Upham v. Shattuck. 151 Kan. 966, 101 P.2d 901 (1940) ; Huffman v. Martin,
226 Ky. 137, 10 S.W.2d 636 (1928).
59. McCarty v. Howell, 24 Ill. 341 (1860) ; accord, Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind.
164 (1876) ; Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa 166, 16 N.W. 64 (1883) ; Ernst v. Steckman,
74 Pa. 13 (1873). Cf. State Bank of Halstad v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N.W.
204 (1912).
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ACCELERATION CLAUSES UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CODE
The draftsmen of the Code recognized that the problem in acceleration
clauses was one of enforceability, not of negotiability, 0 and therefore pro-
vided that no such clause destroys negotiability by reason of lack of
definiteness in time.61 Further, they inserted a special section to take care
of those jurisdictions which destroyed the negotiability of a clause which
accelerated on default in providing further collateral on the theory that it
was a promise to do an act in addition to the payment of money. 62 The
Code's provision reads:
"(1) The negotiability of an instrument is not affected by
(c) a promise to give additional collateral on demand . "
Having thus closed all the loopholes, the Code makes it impossible for an
acceleration clause to destroy negotiability.
The answer to the enforceability problem is to be found in Section
1-208, which reads:
"A term providing that one party may accelerate payment or
performance or require collateral or additional collateral not on stated
contingencies but 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in
words of similar import means that he has power to do so only in the
good faith belief that the prospect of payment or performance is im-
paired but the burden of establishing the lack of good faith is on the
party against whom the power has been exercised."
This is couched in the language of anticipatory repudiation. In fact the
comment to an earlier draft says: 64 "The basic purpose of such clauses
is recognized and given effect in the Sales Article (Article 2). .. ."
Section 2-609 gives one party to a sales contract the right to demand ade-
quate assurance if he has reasonable grounds for insecurity, and if such
assurance is not given, a breach by repudiation occurs.65 The Code there-
60. See text at note 20 supra. See also UCC § 3-109, comment 4: "So far as
certainty of time of payment is concerned a note payable at a definite time but sub-
ject to acceleration is no less certain than a note payable on demand, whose nego-
tiability never has been questioned. It is in fact more certain, since it at least states
a definite time beyond which the instrument cannot run. Objections to the accelera-
tion clause must be based rather on the possibility of abuse by the holder, which
has nothing to do with negotiability and is not limited to negotiable instruments."
61. UCC § 3-109: "(1) An instrument is payable at a definite time if by its
terms it is payable
"(c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration ..
62. See note 56 supra.
63. UCC § 3-112.
64. UCC § 1-208, comment (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950).
65. UCC § 2-609(4). Section 2-610 lists the courses of action available to the
party aggrieved by such repudiation and section 2-611 allows a retraction of the
repudiation before the time set for performance, but only if the aggrieved party
has materially changed his position.
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fore recognizes that the principles of the doctrine apply to acceleration
clauses,66 but unfortunately only to those clauses which allow acceleration
"'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar
import." This means that acceleration will be allowed on other contin-
gencies even though they have little or no connection with the ability of the
obligor to pay. This seems to go against the policy of protecting the debtor
from ruin due to a premature calling by an unscrupulous creditor,6 7
especially where the contingencies are so numerous that they are likely to
occur, or where they are in the control of the holder. However, this un-
desirable result may be circumvented within the framework of the common
law. There are mortgage cases holding that a court of equity has power
to relieve against an acceleration clause where the facts indicate that the
mortgagee's conduct is inequitable. s The court can also restrain the
invoking of the clause where no future inability to pay is shown,69 or where
the mortgagor defaulted by mistake and a foreclosure would work undue
hardship on him.70 There is no reason why these principles could not be
carried over from the mortgage field into an action to restrain the pre-
mature calling of a promissory note.71 Therefore, it would seem better to
66. See UCC § 2-609, comment 2: ". . this section provides- the means by
which the aggrieved party may treat the contract as broken if his reasonable grounds
for insecurity are not cleared up within a reasonable time. This is the principle
underlying the law of anticipatory breach, whether by way of defective part per-
formance or by repudiation."
67. See note 44 supra.
68. Loughery v. Catalano, 117 Misc. 393, 191 N.Y. Supp. 436 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
In this case the mortgagee could accelerate if the mortgagor made any alterations
without first obtaining the mortgagee's consent. Alterations were made but the court
dismissed a foreclosure action because the alterations did not change the character
of the building or the use to which it was put, were not substantial in character
and did not injure the mortgagee or impair the-security. See Graf v. Hope Bldg.
Corp., 254 N.Y. 1, 7, 171 N.E. 884, 886 (1930) (dissenting opinion by Cardozo,
C.J.). See generally, Note, 88 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 94 (1939).
69. Woodward v. Elrod, 154 Ala. 340, 45 So. 647 (1908). Here the clause ac-
celerated if the mortgagor transferred or removed any property, including the crops,
from the land mortgaged to secure the debt. He did so remove and sell some of the
crops, but the court restrained the foreclosure of the mortgage on the ground that
the intent of the parties was that the mortgage could be paid in cash and all the
installments had been paid when due and there was no reason to believe that they
would not be paid when due in the future.
Also see UNIFoRM REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE Acr, § 10, HANDBOOK, NAT. CONF.
ComM'Rs UNIF. STATE LAWs 679 (1927) : "Where the principal of a mortgage, or
any part thereof, has become due by reason of an acceleration clause, payment or
tender before sale on foreclosure, of the amount, other than such principal, due and
in default under the mortgage, with costs of foreclosure including attorney's fees
incurred up to the time of payment or tender, shall relieve from the default whereby
the principal became due, and shall reinstate the terms of the mortgage; and the
foreclosure for such principal shall cease." The comment to this section states:
"The section provides the mortgagor with protection against the right to declare the
whole of a large mortgage due on a default of a few days in an installment. To re-
place the mortgage would require another commission, and there is hardship on the
mortgagor in exposing him to the payment of a large commission because of a slight
default." This Act was withdrawn by the Commissioners in 1943. See HANDBOOK,
NAT. CONF. COMBI'RS UNIF. STATE LAWs 66, 307 (1943).
70. Petterson v. Weinstock, 106 Conn. 436, 138 Atl. 433 (1927).
71. In a recent case, this principle came close to being adopted in the promis-
sory note area. Bischoff v. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), in-
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have set forth this principle in section 1-208 and thus make it apply to all
acceleration clauses. 72
There is another problem raised by section 1-208. If a holder attempts
to accelerate in bad faith, will he be barred from accelerating later? Some
courts might not allow further acceleration since they would like to prevent
unnecessary harassing of debtors. However, it would seem preferable to
allow a second attempt rather than leave a creditor in an insecure position
where there actually is a strong likelihood of inability to pay.
Problems of the Holder in Due Course.-A variation of the problem
of further acceleration occurs when a creditor who has made an ineffectual
attempt to accelerate negotiates the note to another person. If the pur-
chaser has reasonable grounds to believe that acceleration has been nmde
he has notice that the instrument is overdue 73 and is therefore not a holder
in due course.74 But if the purchaser only knows that acceleration has been
attempted, the question would once again arise as to whether he may later
attempt to accelerate.7 5 Here a split could also be predicted, but more
weight should be given to the problems of the holder since the punishment
for harassing a debtor should not be inflicted on a person suing for the
first time.
The other major problem facing a prospective holder in due course
is, the effect on his status of a clause providing that on the happening
of the accelerative events "the principal sum shall become due and payable
immediately." This so-called automatic-acceleration clause was found in
volved a series of late payments. One maker was on duty in Japan. He left money
with the other maker who sent a check to the payee every month thinking he was
on time. After the date for one particular payment had passed, payee immediately
notified makers of his exercise of option to accelerate. The makers made immediate
tender and kept the tender open. The lower court found that the holder was in-
terested mainly in accelerating the debt, and not in getting his installments as they
fell due. (The evidence also tended to show that there was no danger of his not
being paid in the future.) The petition to accelerate was denied and this was
affirmed on appeal. The court noted that equity could relieve against acceleration
when it is caused by the inequitable conduct of the creditor himself, and imposed
the requirement that the holder first make a demand before declaring the whole sum
due.
72. This may be the result under the Code anyway. § 1-203 states: "Every
contract within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." The comment to this section notes that this is a general principle
of the Code and that particular applications of the principle appear scattered through-
out (citing, inter alia, § 1-208). The draftsmen then seemingly annihilate the re-
strictions in § 1-208 by saying: "The concept, however, is broader than any of these
illustrations and applies generally, as stated in this section, to the performance or
enforcement of every contract within this Act." A negotiable instrument can be
considered a contract under § 1-201 (11) : "'Contract' means the total obligation in
law which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act, and any other
applicable rules of law."
73. UCC § 3-304(4) (c).
74. UCC § 3-302(1) (c).
75. Under an earlier draft, the purchaser would not have been a holder in due
course if he had reasonable grounds to believe that "acceleration of the instrument
has been made or attempted." UCC § 3-304(4) (c) (Proposed Final Draft, Spring
1950). As one not a holder in due course, he is subject to all defenses which would
be available in an action on a simple contract. UCC § 3-306(b). This would then
depend on what stand the court took with regard to further acceleration by the
original creditor.
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20 of the notes in use today. Under the NIL, the courts were fairly
evenly split on whether the occurrence of the named events actually did
mature the note and make it overdue so that a subsequent holder could
not be one in due course. 76 Unfortunately, it appears that the Code does
not resolve this conflict. If the purchaser has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that acceleration has been made, he cannot be a holder in due course.
Does the fact that the note contains an automatic acceleration clause put
him on notice that it might be overdue? The states holding that such a
clause matures the instrument could easily hold that the purchaser has
sufficient notice to be placed on his guard at that time, since the clause is
in the note.7 7 It would seem that the better construction is that proposed
by Professor Chafee: "The ultimate time of payment is the maturity of the
instrument for all purposes with respect to persons who have not received
notice that the fact which was to accelerate payment has occurred." 78
Notwithstanding the resolution of the above conflict, a holder of a note
with an automatic acceleration clause in it is excused from delay in present-
ment or notice of dishonor or protest (where the clause operates to mature
the note automatically) when he is without knowledge that it is due.79
Burden of Proof.-The Code puts the burden of establishing the
holder's lack of good faith on the maker. This burden is defined as "the
burden of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more
probable than its non-existence." 80 This means that the holder need not
introduce evidence of good faith to get to the jury unless the rare case occurs
where the quantum of the maker's evidence is so great that the court will
direct a verdict in his favor. If the maker's evidence is less than that, the
holder could take the chance that the jury would not be persuaded by it.
The "good faith" in issue means "honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned." s1 It seems fair that the maker be the one to carry this
burden, since creditors frequently must act on the basis of confidential
information or evidence which does not amount to definite proof. Makers
should not be allowed to take advantage of the technical rules of evidence
to hinder collection attempts unless they can show a lack of good faith. In
certain instances it may be to the maker's best interests to keep secret the
information which led to the holder's insecure feeling.82 The Code leaves
76. See cases collected in 159 A.L.R. 1078 et seq. (1945).
77. See Wulfekuhler State Bank v. Wible, 121 Kan. 66, 245 Pac. 1067 (1926).
This has also been done in a statute of limitations problem. Barnwell v. Hanson,
80 Ga. App. 738, 57 S.E.2d 348 (1950), held that the statute starts running im-
mediately upon the maker's failure to pay an interest installment where the note is
accelerated automatically. The theory of the court was that the purchaser saw the
clause in the note and should have investigated.
78. Chafee, supra note 10, at 757.
79. UCC § 3-511 (1). Comment 2 to this section specifically negates, in this
situation, the split envisaged above. It notes that: "This [excuse for delay] is
true where an instrument has been accelerated without his [holder's] knowl-
edge. .. "
80. UCC § 1-201(8).
81. UCC § 1-201(19).
82. Such might be the case if the feeling is due to the maker's indiscreet choice
of companions or misfortune at the gaming tables.
